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INTRODUCTION
My topic is both timely and perennial: The Electoral College. More
specifically, I will first discuss the constitutional problem known as the
“Faithless Elector” and, then, I will attempt to solve such problem. My
proposed solution is the Uniform Faithful Presidential Electors Act
(UFPEA), a statute that several states have adopted.1
The “problem of the faithless elector” is posed by the possibility
that a presidential elector—pledged to vote for his or her party’s
nominee for president—fails to do so, either by voting for another
candidate or by not voting at all. The Supreme Court last spoke to this
issue in a 1952 decision, Ray v. Blair.2 As we shall see, however, that
decision explicitly left open the question of the legal enforceability, or
binding quality, of the pledge that a presidential elector might
previously have been required to take.3 The UFPEA is an attempt to
solve, or perhaps one should say, sidestep, that problem. But, as I shall
argue, that statute, though subtle and inventive, is unconstitutional.
The possibility of a faithless elector is a real and troubling
problem. In the presidential election of 2012, as many as five potential
Republican electors hinted that they would not vote for the Republican
presidential nominee, Mitt Romney, and would prefer his rival Ron Paul
instead.4 In the 2000 election, one elector from the District of Columbia
abstained from voting for the Democratic presidential nominee, Al
Gore.5 Since George W. Bush obtained only 271 electoral votes that
year—one vote over the majority of 270 required to win the
presidency—a bare handful of defections could have decided the
outcome.6 There have been at least 157 faithless electors in the course
of the country’s constitutional history, including the elections of 1948,
1956, 1960, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1988, 2000, and 2004.7 In this
extraordinary political year, the chance of faithless electors surely
1 Adopting States include Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska and Nevada. See Faithful
Presidential Electors Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION: THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS
ON
UNIFORM
STATE
LAWS,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/
Act.aspx?title=Faithful%20Presidential%20Electors%20Act.
2 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
3 See infra Part III.
4 See Robert M. Alexander, Rogue Electors Threaten Elections’ Integrity, CNN (Oct. 26
2012, 1:12 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/22/opinion/alexander-electors.
5 See David Stout, The 43rd President: The Electoral College; The Electors Vote, and the
Surprises Are Few, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 19, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/
19/us/43rd-president-electoral-college-electors-vote-surprises-are-few.html.
6 See Alexander, supra note 4.
7 See THOMAS H. NEALE, THE ELECTORAL COLL.: HOW IT WORKS IN CONTEMPORARY
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 7 (Apr. 13, 2016); Faithless
Electors, FAIR VOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/faithless_electors [http://archive.fairvote.org/
?page=973].
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cannot be discounted.
In order to analyze the constitutional and legal issues here, it is
necessary, first, to return to the origins of that distinctively American
institution, the Electoral College, as it emerged from the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 and was explained to the Ratifiers thereafter.
Second, after that necessarily brief survey, this Article will lay out
the textual, structural, and other arguments for concluding that
presidential electors exercise constitutionally protected discretion in
how they cast their ballots for president (and vice president), and
attempts to eliminate such discretion are unconstitutional. In that
connection, we must consider the broader background of late 18th
century political practices, both in this country and in England, from
which so much of our constitutional culture derives. Two aspects of that
practice will require particular attention: the absence of political parties,
and the debate over legislative “instructions.”
Third, this Article will examine the Supreme Court’s decision in
Ray v. Blair, which leaves open the critical question of whether the
breach of an elector’s pledge has any legal remedy consistent with the
Constitution.8
Finally, this Article will assess the constitutionality of the UFPEA
against the constitutional standards that have been articulated. This
analysis will advance two main arguments for concluding that the
UFPEA is unconstitutional. The more decisive argument is based on the
original Constitution; the other argument examines the First
Amendment.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
The term “Electoral College” is not used in the Constitution. The
term “Electoral Colleges” would be far better, because Article II,
Section 1, Clause 2 expressly provides that the electors are to meet “in
their respective States.”9 (This requirement was introduced to prevent
the bribery or corruption of the electors, which the Framers thought
would be easier to do if they were all assembled in a single place.)
Better still would be the term “Electoral Congresses.” That is because
the voting structure of the Electoral College resembles, apparently by
design, that of the Federal Congress: each state is assigned as many
electoral votes as it has members of the U.S. House of Representatives,
plus two additional votes, corresponding to its two members of the U.S.
Senate.10 If this structural similarity is indeed intentional, then it
8 See infra Part III.
9 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
10 See Shlomo Slonim, The Electoral College at Philadelphia: The Evolution of an Ad Hoc
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provides some support for thinking that the presidential electors,
forming as it were an ad hoc Congress, have as much discretion to vote
as the members of Congress do.
The original constitutional provisions for the Electoral College are
set out in Article II, Section 1, Clauses 2 and 311 which are elaborately
detailed. Their intricacy may reflect the extreme difficulties that the
Framers had encountered in addressing the problem of a presidential
election—an issue that Pennsylvania Framer James Wilson described as
“in truth the most difficult of all on which we have had to decide.”12 At
first, the Framers thought highly of their invention: in The Federalist
No. 68, Hamilton wrote that “[t]he mode of appointment of the Chief
Magistrate of the United States . . . . it be not perfect, it is at least
excellent.”13 But, unfortunately, the arrangements rapidly proved to be
disappointing. By 1823, James Madison, in a letter to George Hay, was
prepared to attribute the provisions to the “fatigue and impatience”
produced in the delegates by their long, exhausting summer in
Philadelphia.14
Practical experience had indeed revealed devastating weaknesses
in the original plan. Owing to the terms of Article II, the presidential
election of 1796 produced what we would call a “split” ticket in which a
Federalist candidate, John Adams, was elected president and his
political opponent, the Republican Thomas Jefferson, was elected vice
president. Worse still, in the presidential election of 1800, the Electoral
College provisions produced an unintended tie between two
Republicans, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr, which in turn led to a
prolonged and nearly disastrous stalemate in the House of
Representatives (on which the choice then fell).15 Fearing repetition of
Congress for the Selection of a President, 73 J. AM. HIST. 35, 52 (1986) (“In effect, the Electoral
College was simply a special congress elected to choose a president, without the shortcomings of
the real Congress.”).
11 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2–3.
12 Ellis Katz, The American Electoral College 1, http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/gov/
katzelectoralcollege.pdf.
13 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton).
14 In his letter to George Hay, James Madison stated:
The difficulty of finding an unexceptionable process for appointing the Executive
Organ of a Government such as that of the U.S. was deeply felt by the Convention; and
as the final arrangement of it took place in the latter stage of the Session, it was not
exempt from a degree of the hurrying influence produced by fatigue and impatience in
all such Bodies, tho’ the degree was much less than usually prevails in them.
Letter from James Madison to George Hay, THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (Aug. 23, 1823),
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a2_1_2-3s10.html. Criticism of the Electoral
College has been unrelenting. For a leading constitutional scholar’s objections, see SANFORD
LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG
(AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 81–97 (2006).
15 See EDWARD J. LARSON, A MAGNIFICENT CATASTROPHE: THE TUMULTUOUS ELECTION
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these calamities, the Framing generation ratified the Twelfth
Amendment on June 15, 1804, in time for the presidential election of
that year. Apart from the Bill of Rights and the Eleventh Amendment,
the Twelfth Amendment is the only modification of the original
Constitution to have been made in the Framing period. Later
constitutional amendments have made further changes in the
presidential election process, such as conferring electoral votes on the
District of Columbia,16 limiting an incumbent president’s eligibility to
be elected for a third term,17 and altering the date of the president’s
inauguration.18 But the core of the process remains as it was in the 1804
presidential election.
The scheme of the Electoral College emerged only at a very late
stage in the Philadelphia Convention. No one knows exactly which of
the delegates originated the idea. (James Wilson had earlier introduced a
proposal for the indirect popular election of the president by means of a
district-based selection of “electors” from the national legislature 19—but
what the Framers eventually proposed is strikingly different from
Wilson’s original plan.20) A careful, scholarly study by Shlomo
Slonim21 traces through the debates over the method of selecting the
president—a matter over which the Framers wrangled at great length,
which they found themselves unable to resolve (and which in the end
they referred to an eleven member committee, charmingly named the
Committee on Unfinished Parts, chaired by the former Chief Justice of
New Jersey, the little remembered David Brearly22). The Committee’s
proposal was explained and defended, however, by Gouverneur Morris,
a prominent and highly influential delegate, and seems to have met with
general satisfaction. Slonim found that
The delegates . . . were impressed with the Electoral College scheme,
OF 1800, AMERICA’S FIRST PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN (2006) (discussing the election of 1800);
BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND
THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 16–108 (2005); JOHN FERLING, ADAMS VS.
JEFFERSON: THE TUMULTUOUS ELECTION OF 1800 (PIVOTAL MOMENTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY)
(2004); NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, JR., THE JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICANS: THE FORMATION OF
PARTY ORGANIZATION, 1789–1801, 211–48 (1957).
16 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1.
18 U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
19 Records of the Federal Convention, THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (1787), http://press-

pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a2_1_2-3s2.html.
20 See Daniel J. McCarthy, James Wilson and the Creation of the Presidency, 17
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 689 (1987) (discussing Wilson’s role).
21 Slonim, supra note 10. For more on the origins of the idea of the Electoral College, see
SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 48–51 (2015).
22 See
David
Brearly,
TEACHINGAMERICANHISTORY.ORG,
http://
teachingamericanhistory.org/static/convention/delegates/brearly.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2016)
(providing a brief biography of Brearly’s life).
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which so successfully blended all the necessary elements to ensure a
safe and equitable process for electing a president and which
reserved considerable influence for the states. . . . The Electoral
College constituted a package deal in which diverse interests and
safeguards were neatly balanced.23

The most significant change made to the Committee’s proposal
was giving the House of Representatives, rather than the Senate, the
default role of selecting the president if no one had obtained an
Electoral College majority.24 The only other change of significance was
to bar federal legislators and those who occupied federal offices of
“profit or trust” from serving as electors.25
The Framers’ eventual method for electing the president could be
said to have been influenced by their conception of the presidential
office itself. Plainly, American conditions precluded us from having a
hereditary monarch, despite the advantages that several Framers
(perhaps under David Hume’s influence26) saw in it.27 But the Framers
eventually agreed on an institution that in many respects can be
considered a kind of elective monarchy—and so not altogether unlike
the proposal that Alexander Hamilton had daringly put before the
Convention in his speech of June 18, 1787.28 As John Adams put it, in a
23
24
25
26

Slonim, supra note 10, at 54.
Id.
Id.
See DAVID HUME, That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science, in ESSAYS MORAL,
POLITICAL, LITERARY (Eugene F. Miller ed., 1777), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/hume-essaysmoral-political-literary-lf-ed?q=hereditary#Hume_0059_115.
This chief magistrate may be either elective or hereditary; and though the former
institution may, to a superficial view, appear the most advantageous; yet a more
accurate inspection will discover in it greater inconveniencies than in the latter, and
such as are founded on causes and principles eternal and immutable.
Id. Hume’s influence on the Framers, including Benjamin Franklin (who knew Hume personally),
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, was considerable. See John M. Werner, David Hume
and America, 33 J. HIST. IDEAS 439 (1972). Especially notable is Hume’s influence on Madison’s
thinking about “factions.” See Douglass Adair, That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science: David
Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist, 20 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 343 (1957). For
amplification, see Mark G. Spencer, Hume and Madison on Faction, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 869
(2002).
27 See CHARLES C. THACH. JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775–1789: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 80–81 (1922).
28 See Alexander Hamilton, Federal Convention, THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (1787),
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch8s10.html. Hamilton’s proposal for an
elective monarchy was in fact representative of the thinking of an important segment of American
opinion in 1787. See FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: ESSAYS BY DOUGLASS ADAIR 94–96,
166–69 (Trevor Colbourn ed., 1974). See also PRAKASH, supra note 21, at 36–62; ERIC NELSON,
THE ROYALIST REVOLUTION: MONARCHY AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 29 (2014). Sir
William Blackstone, a major influence on the Founders, pronounced an elective monarchy to be
“the most obvious, and best suited of any to the rational principles of government, and the
freedom of human nature.” 1 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
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1789 letter to Roger Sherman, no “other name can with propriety be
given” to our Constitution than that of “a monarchical republic, or if
you will, a limited monarchy.”29
Early modern Europe had afforded many examples of elective
monarchies, including the Papacy, the Holy Roman Empire,30 Venice,
Poland and (previously) Holland.31 But it seems clear that the Framers
did not have any such models in mind, and indeed found some of them
extremely defective.32 Instead, the Electoral College was seemingly
modeled on the system that Maryland, under its Constitution of 1776,
had employed to select state senators.33 (Of note, a delegate from
Maryland, Charles Carroll, was a member of the Brearly Committee.)
That Constitution established a Senate of fifteen members, and an
electoral college was formed to choose those senators. 34 In every
county, voters selected two electors, while Baltimore and Annapolis
each sent one elector. Senators were not required to represent
jurisdictions; rather, the only stipulation provided in the Maryland
Constitution was that nine senators should reside on the western shore,
and the other six on the eastern shore.35
The Framers were of course well aware of Maryland’s Electoral
College. In the speech by Hamilton referred to earlier, he noted that in
considering models for the Executive, the Senate of Maryland was
“much appealed to.”36 And in a letter to Thomas Jefferson of 1788,
James Madison refers to the Maryland Electoral College when advising
Jefferson on the options for the election of a Governor of Virginia.37
ENGLAND 185 (Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press 1979), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/
documents/a2_1_2-3s1.html. See JEREMY BLACK, GEORGE III: AMERICA’S LAST KING 22–23
(2006) (discussing eighteenth century elective monarchies).
29 JOHN ADAMS, THE PORTABLE JOHN ADAMS 396, 399 (John Patrick Diggins ed., 2004).
30 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 19 (Alexander Hamilton and James Madison). Of interest,
Americans presumably were aware that the Hanoverian Kings of England, including George III,
were also Kings of Hanover, and hence “electors” of the Holy Roman Empire. Unlike the votes of
other electors (which were in principle absolutely free), the Hanoverian votes had to be cast for a
particular candidate. See Marta Vajnagi, Britain-Hanover and the Imperial Election of 1745, 14
HUNG. J. OF ENG. & AMER. STUD. 51, 51–52 (2008); François Velde, The Holy Roman Empire
13–15 (2004), http://www.heraldica.org/topics/national/hre.htm#Electors.
31 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 20 (Alexander Hamilton and James Madison).
32 For Madison’s arguments to the Philadelphia Convention on the liabilities of the Holy
Roman Empire and Poland, recorded in his notes on the debates of July 25, 1787, see Madison
Debates July 25: In Convention, YALE LAW SCHOOL: THE AVALON PROJECT (1787), http://
avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_725.asp.
33 MD. CONST. of 1776, art. I; id. art. XI.
34 Id. art. XIV; id. art. XV.
35 See Charles A. Rees, Remarkable Evolution: The Early Constitutional History of
Maryland, 36 U. BALT. L. REV. 217 (2007).
36 See Alexander Hamilton, Federal Convention, THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (1787),
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch8s10.html.
37 See generally James Madison, Observations on Jefferson’s Draft of a Constitution for
Virginia, THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (1788), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/
documents/v1ch17s25.html.
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Madison may well be recapitulating arguments voiced at length the
previous year at the Philadelphia Convention:
An election by the Legislature is liable to insuperable objections. It
not only tends to faction intrigue and corruption, but leaves the
Executive under the influence of an improper obligation to that
department. An election by the people at large, as in this & several
other States—or by Electors as in the appointment of the Senate in
Maryland, or indeed by the people through any other channel than
their legislative representatives, seem to be far preferable.38

Assuming, as is highly plausible, that the Maryland Electoral
College was the model used in the Federal Constitution, it would seem
that presidential electors were expected, indeed required, to exercise
discretion in their choices. Article XVIII of the 1776 Maryland
Constitution read:
That the electors, immediately on their meeting, and before they
proceed to the election of Senators, take such oath of support and
fidelity to this State, as this Convention, or the Legislature, shall
direct; and also an oath “to elect without favour, affection, partiality,
or prejudice, such persons for Senators, as they, in their judgment
and conscience, believe best qualified for the office.”39

The ratification debate makes abundantly clear that the presidential
electors were intended to exercise judgment and discretion. Indeed, that
they would do so was made a selling point in favor of the Electoral
College. In The Federalist No. 68, Alexander Hamilton explained the
merits of the Electoral College as follows:
It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the
choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be
confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of
making it, not to any preestablished body, but to men chosen by the
people for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture.
It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be made
by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station,
and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a
judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which
were proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons,
selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most
likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such
complicated investigations.40

On Hamilton’s account, the presidential electors are chosen for the
38 Id. (emphasis added).
39 MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XVIII (emphasis added).
40 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton).
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specific purpose of “analyzing the qualities” needed in a president; they
will “act[] under circumstances favorable to deliberation;” and their
decisions will display a “judicious combination of all the reasons and
inducements . . . proper to govern their choice.” 41 It would be difficult
to affirm more clearly that the electors must exercise judgment and
discretion.
Likewise, John Jay argued in The Federalist No. 64 that the
Framers’ proposed method for electing the president would tend to
result in the selection of a person of the highest quality. 42 And again,
such outcomes will be produced by relying on the discretion and
judgment of the electors themselves:
As the select assemblies for choosing the President, as well as the
State legislatures who appoint the senators, will in general be
composed of the most enlightened and respectable citizens, there is
reason to presume that their attention and their votes will be directed
to those men only who have become the most distinguished by their
abilities and virtue, and in whom the people perceive just grounds for
confidence. The Constitution manifests very particular attention to
this object. By excluding men under thirty-five from the first office,
and those under thirty from the second, it confines the electors to
men of whom the people have had time to form a judgment, and with
respect to whom they will not be liable to be deceived by those
brilliant appearances of genius and patriotism, which, like transient
meteors, sometimes mislead as well as dazzle. If the observation be
well founded, that wise kings will always be served by able
ministers, it is fair to argue, that as an assembly of select electors
possess, in a greater degree than kings, the means of extensive and
accurate information relative to men and characters, so will their
appointments bear at least equal marks of discretion and
discernment.43

At least some early candidates for presidential electorships took the
view that they would be entitled, if not bound, to exercise discretion in
casting their ballots. William Deakins, a candidate for one of
Maryland’s presidential electorships in 1796, pledged “to vote for that
man, who to my judgment, after all information I can obtain, shall
appear best qualified.”44 To be sure, by 1796 it was becoming harder to
maintain such an independent position—but even so, it still remained
possible.

41
42
43
44

See id.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay).
See id.
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 15, at 96.
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II. TEXT, STRUCTURE AND FOUNDING ERA PRACTICE
A.

Text and Structure

The view that the Constitution requires presidential electors to
exercise discretion in voting for the president does not rest solely on the
evidence of original intent. Both the text and the structure of the
Constitution indicate that their independent judgment is required.
To begin with, consider the term “elector” itself, as used in Article
II, Section 1, Clause 2. The term was, of course, common in eighteenth
century political discourse—e.g., in Edmund Burke’s celebrated 1774
Speech to the Electors of Bristol.45 An “elector” was simply someone
who had the right to vote—as Burke’s Bristol constituents did. So we
find Sir William Blackstone, in the chapter “Of Elections” in his
Commentaries on the Laws of England, unselfconsciously using the
term “electors” as synonymous with “voters.”46 The term “elector”
occurs in precisely that sense elsewhere in the Constitution—as in
Article I, Section 2, Clause 1, which prescribes that the “Electors in
each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the
most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”47 In commenting on
this provision in The Federalist No. 57, Hamilton (or Madison) clinches
the point that an “elector” simply meant a “voter”:
Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the
rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not
the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons
of obscurity and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great
body of the people of the United States. They are to be the same who
exercise the right in every State of electing the corresponding branch
of the legislature of the State.48

But an ordinary voter, or one who has the right of suffrage, cannot
be constrained in the exercise of that right. The voter’s choices may
indeed be limited, but they cannot be compelled. And “electors” are
voters.
Other textual indications also point to the conclusion that electors
are to exercise discretion and judgment. For one, the requirement that
electors are to meet “in their respective States,”49 seems gratuitous—

45 Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (1774),
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch13s7.html.
46 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 28.
47 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
48 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison).
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
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unless we assume, as The Federalist tells us, that this is a precaution
designed to prevent intrigue, cabal, and corruption. But those evils
could only arise if the electors had discretion how to cast their votes:
automata cannot conspire, nor can they be bribed. Further, the electors
are required to “vote by Ballot,”50 and the late eighteenth century
“ballot” was usually not a pre-printed form created by the state with the
names of the candidates inscribed on it; but often merely a blank piece
of paper, on which an elector wrote the names of his selections and
brought it to the poll.51 Indeed, pre-printed ballots were not allowed in
some states and did not become common until 1800 or later. “A
precursor of the printed ballot appeared in the 1796 presidential election
in Philadelphia, [as] the result of developing partisan machinery
there.”52 But that, of course, was several years after the Constitution was
drafted and ratified. Hence casting a “Ballot,” at the Framing, involved
a decision to write down a particular name.
Moreover, at the Framing, “candidates” were not usually formally
“nominated” in any case. “A citizen would cast his vote for any
individual for any office.”53 Indeed, one might be elected to an office
without knowing beforehand that one might be the choice or intending
to be a candidate. Thus, John Marshall (later Chief Justice) was elected
to the Virginia House of Delegates in 1795—although he was
supporting someone else for that office.54 The first known state-wide
nominating conventions were held in Pennsylvania for the presidential
election of 1789—but Pennsylvania was far ahead of other States in
developing a party system.55 The backdrop of contemporary voting
practices reinforces the claim that a presidential elector’s “Ballot” had
to reflect a discretionary choice.
Further, Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 specifies that electors shall
vote “for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of
the same State with themselves.” That is the only constraint the
Constitution explicitly imposes on an elector’s discretion how to cast
his vote. In the 1995 Term Limits case,56 the Supreme Court ruled that
the constitutional enumeration of the qualifications for election to the
House of Representatives57 was exhaustive—thus excluding the
possibility of state legislation limiting the number of terms for which an

50 U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
51 However, in Rhode Island, New York and Pennsylvania, printed ballots were in use for
elections in the colonial period. See CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE FROM
PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY 1760–1860, 59 (1960).
52 JOHN F. HOADLEY, ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES: 1789–1803, 43 (1986).
53 Id. at 37; see also CUNNINGHAM, supra note 15, at 33–35.
54 See HOADLEY, supra note 52, at 37.
55 See id. at 38.
56 U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
57 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
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incumbent could be re-elected.58 It is equally plausible to read the
constitutional specification of how an elector must vote as exclusive,
thus ruling out the possibility of any additional state legislative
constraint on the elector’s choice.
B.

Founding Era Practice

I have been arguing that the political culture, traditions, and
practices in which the Constitution was embedded shed light on the
meaning of the Electoral College Clauses. Two further aspects of that
surrounding culture need to be considered. One concerns the absence of
political parties at the time of the Founding. The other has to do with the
practice of giving “instructions” to elected representatives, particularly
senators.
1.

Political Parties

Political parties, in anything like the form in which we know them,
did not exist at the time of the Founding. There were, to be sure, shifting
political groupings or alliances, such as the “Whigs” and “Tories,”
found in the eighteenth century English Parliament. 59 But traditionally,
“parties” had been equated with “factions” and, as such, condemned.60
The very idea of a “party,” as we would understand it, had only begun
58 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 780.
59 See DAVID HUME, ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL, LITERARY, PART I (Eugene F. Miller ed.,
1777),
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/hume-essays-moral-political-literary-lfed?q=hereditary#Hume_0059_115; HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, STATESMANSHIP AND PARTY
GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF BURKE AND BOLINGBROKE 4–5 (1965) (explaining origins of Whigs
and Tories and why they were not parties); FRANK O’GORMAN, THE EMERGENCE OF THE
BRITISH TWO-PARTY SYSTEM 1760–1832, ix–x (1982) (no political parties in mid-eighteenth
century Britain); O’GORMAN, supra note 59, at 23 (as of 1790, “party ideas . . . appealed, at most,
to one third of the House of Commons”); ACKERMAN, supra note 15, at 17 (“Nothing resembling
the modern party system had yet emerged as an historical reality. Even in England, the words
‘Whig’ and ‘Tory’ marked extended groupings of elite families, locked in factional struggle for
power and patronage.”); GHITA IONESCU & ISABEL DE MADARIAGA, OPPOSITION 55–56 (1968)
(“With the advent of George III, and during the long régime of [Lord] North, the Whigs in
opposition evolved sufficiently in doctrine, organization and solidarity of party, to force the King
to accept them, on their terms, in 1782 as an alternative government. But if the Whigs were by
now a party in Burke’s sense of the word, the Tories were not.”).
60 See Caroline Robbins, “Discordant Parties”: A Study of the Acceptance of Party by
Englishmen, 73 POL. SCI. Q. 505, 507 (1958) (“Englishmen of all sorts during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries deplored party and expatiated in speeches, pamphlets and histories on the
evils of faction.”). For brief discussion of some American views of party (John Adams, Benjamin
Franklin, James Madison, George Washington), see id. at 509–10. Condemnations of “faction”
can be traced back as far as classical Athens. See THOMAS N. MITCHELL, DEMOCRACY’S
BEGINNING: THE ATHENIAN STORY 241–43, 302 (2015).
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to be defined when the Constitution was framed.
Since the Founders were clueless about the operation of a two-party
system, they did not hit upon the solution that seems obvious to us:
design a system under which each party nominates a presidential
ticket. Instead of delegating the nomination functions to the parties,
they supposed the Constitution itself had to provide a non-party
mechanism that picked out the best candidates.61

The historian Richard Hofstadter discerned three trends in English
political thought that prefigured the development of what we would
recognize as political parties.62 First, early in the eighteenth century, the
English politician and author Henry St. John Bolingbroke had published
a series of letters in which he effectively denounced “parties” and called
for their suppression.63 Despite Bolingbroke’s language, however, there
is a scholarly consensus that “none of the modern institutional forms
associated with parties existed at that time. There was no organization,
nor was there any substantial electoral base.”64 Somewhat later in the
eighteenth century, David Hume drew a distinction between a “faction”
and a “party,” viewing the former as an unmitigated evil but the latter as
an inevitable, if not always wholesome, consequence of free
government. For Hume, “[f]actions subvert government, render laws
impotent, and beget the fiercest animosities among men of the same
nation.”65 James Madison echoes Hume’s sentiments by defining a
“faction” as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a
minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community.”66 But Madison elides the distinction, found in other
writers, between “faction” and “party.”67
The first thinker of consequence to distinguish clearly between
“faction” and “party,” and to pronounce “parties” affirmatively good,
61 ACKERMAN, supra note 15, at 27.
62 See HOADLEY, supra note 52, at 9–11 (discussing Hofstader); see also MANSFIELD, supra
note 59, at 15–16 (thumbnail sketches of views of Bolingbroke, Hume and Burke).
63 Henry St. John Bolingbroke, Dissertation Upon Parties (1733–1734), http://
socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/bolingbroke/parties.html.
64 HOADLEY, supra note 52, at 22.
65 DAVID HUME, Of Parties in General, in ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL, LITERARY (Eugene
F. Miller ed., 1777), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/hume-essays-moral-political-literary-lfed?q=hereditary#Hume_0059_115.
66 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
67 Madison’s experience of politics in the 1790s significantly altered his view of factions,
leading him to reconsider the position he had taken in The Federalist No. 10 and bringing him to
see the need for political parties. See Robert A. Dahl, James Madison: Republican or Democrat?,
3 PERSP. POL. 439, 443–45 (2005). Madison’s change of heart was due primarily to the
emergence of a “Federalist” party under the aegis of Alexander Hamilton. On these innovations,
see William Nisbet Chambers, Party Development and Party Action: The American Origins, 3
HIST. & THEORY 91, 99–106 (1963).
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was the British parliamentarian and thinker Edmund Burke. In his
Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770), Burke
famously wrote that “[p]arty is a body of men united, for promoting by
their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular
principle in which they are all agreed.”68 But for years after Burke
wrote, the British party system remained rudimentary in form. 69 Indeed,
even Burke himself had “nothing to say about the organization of party
nor the institutionalization of its activities.”70
Burke’s ideas on party have had a benign and lasting influence,71
and by 1816, Bertrand de Moleville could affirm that “an opposition
party in the parliament, [is] the only means to maintain the full
confidence and submission of the nation to the decisions of these
assemblies.”72 But Burke’s “favorable opinion of party seemed to have
little or no impact on American political thought at that time.”73 Indeed,
the American experience of parties as of the time of the Framing was
substantially similar to Britain’s. Although party historians differ about
the defining criteria of “parties” and, as a consequence, differ as to their
point of origin, “[p]arty labels, party platforms, and mass-based party
organizations were not . . . part of the system” under the Articles of
Confederation.74 Further, at the Philadelphia Convention itself, “it
appears clear that no solid foundations for a party system were
established. At most, there existed a set of shifting factions, but they
certainly did not exhibit the strength, depth, or stability of parties.”75
The best that can be said is that the process of party development was
soon to be underway. “[D]uring Washington’s first Administration
neither Jefferson nor anyone else in the United States conceived of the
sort of popular party which he was later to lead.”76 Even after the
Republican victories over the Federalist candidates in the congressional
elections of 1792–1793, Thomas Jefferson could express the hope that
the electoral outcome marked the end, not the beginning, of party
rivalry.77
68 EDMUND BURKE, PRE-REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS 187 (Ian Harris ed., 1993).
69 HOADLEY, supra note 52, at 23 (finding the election of 1784 to be “an important turning
point for the British party system,” but cautioning that “it is important not to overstate the
maturity of that party system”); see also id. at 24 (reporting conclusion of historian Sir Louis
Namier that “there was ‘no trace of a two-party system, or at all of party in the modern sense’”
before about 1790).
70 O’GORMAN, supra note 59, at 9.
71 See JESSE NORMAN, EDMUND BURKE: THE FIRST CONSERVATIVE 216–18, 222–25 (2013).
72 Robbins, supra note 60, at 511.
73 HOADLEY, supra note 52, at 11.
74 Id. at 27.
75 Id. at 29.
76 JOSEPH CHARLES, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM: THREE ESSAYS 83
(1956).
77 See JOHN ZVESPER, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF
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Jefferson’s Report on the Privileges and Restrictions on the
Commerce of the United States in Foreign Countries of December
179378 and Madison’s resolutions on it in the House of Representatives
in January 179479 were the first announcements, it appears, of anything
recognizable as an opposition party’s program.80 “It is not until the
summer of 1795, when numerous and highly successful mass meetings
were being held from Georgia to New Hampshire to protest against the
Jay Treaty, that we can see even the outlines of a popular party on a
national basis.”81 As late as 1796, Washington’s Farewell Address gave
warning “in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the
spirit of party.”82 Indeed Duke University political scientist John
Aldrich has argued that the Constitution itself gave rise to our original
political parties (which themselves fell far short of the modern political
party) because it created collective action problems that those parties
arose to solve—in particular, the “resolution of remaining ambiguity
over the Constitution . . . . the ‘great principle,’ [of] exactly how
powerful and positive the new federal government was to be.”83
The absence of political parties must inform our understanding of
the Framers’ design for the Electoral College. There were no formal or
institutionalized procedures for nominating national candidates to the
Presidency; no organizations to campaign or electioneer on behalf of a
party’s candidates; no (or few84) “tickets,” “slates,” or “platforms”; and
no “pledges.” The very necessity for the Twelfth Amendment shows
how undeveloped the political party apparatus for electing a president
was—there had been no “party” identifications sufficient to prevent the
AMERICAN PARTY POLITICS 79–80 (1977). See also CUNNINGHAM, supra note 15, at 45–49
(analyzing the election of 1792, and concluding that while there is “some evidence that the
Republican interest was beginning to organize . . . . parties did not yet reach very deeply into the
political life of the country”).
78 REP. ON THE PRIVILEGES AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE COM. OF THE U.S. IN FOREIGN
COUNTRIES, YALE LAW SCHOOL: THE AVALON PROJECT (1793), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/jeffrep2.asp.
79 Commercial Discrimination, FOUNDERS ONLINE: NATIONAL ARCHIVES (1794), http://
founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-15-02-0111.
80 CHARLES, supra note 76, at 93–98. By the Presidential election of 1800, party “platforms”
were starting to be formed. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 15, at 211–12.
81 CHARLES, supra note 76, at 83.
82 George Washington, Washington’s Farewell Address, YALE LAW SCHOOL: THE AVALON
PROJECT (1796), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp.
83 JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL
PARTIES IN AMERICA 71–72 (1995). See also IONESCU & DE MADARIAGA, supra note 59, at 59–
60 (“The coherent and systematic organization of government support [under George Washington
and Alexander Hamilton] soon led to the counter process, the emergence of a movement designed
to challenge the domination of the Federalists. . . . Once divergent views on the government’s
interpretation of the constitution had come into the open, opinion was bound to polarize around
them.”)
84 In the first presidential election, only two States, Pennsylvania and Maryland, used general
ticket elections to select their Presidential electors. In the second Presidential election, these two
States were joined by New Hampshire. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 29–30 (1892).
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election of a Federalist president together with a Republican vicepresident in 1796. And even in the election of 1800, which has been
seen as “a contest between recently organized political parties,” the two
Republican candidates inadvertently tied each other in the Electoral
College vote.85 Indeed, the Electoral College itself seems to have
stimulated the emergence of political parties. It gradually became
obvious that if one wanted to win the presidency for someone of
sympathetic views, it would be essential to unite around a single
candidate and organize concerted, nationwide efforts in support of his
candidacy.86
In the context of the Founding, therefore, it would have been
absurd to suppose that electors might be either “faithful” or “faithless”
to their parties’ nominees for president. Their voting choices would
inherently have had to be discretionary and unfettered.
2.

“Instructions”

The political culture of late eighteenth century America and
England might also bear on the question of the Electoral College in
another way. Both before, during and after the Framing period, claims
were often made for a power, or right, to “instruct” those who had been
elected to office, or at least to some offices. In post-constitutional
American practice, this power or right was most often claimed for, and
was indeed sometimes exercised by, state legislatures. Such
“instructions” were directed or applied principally to U.S. senators who,
before the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, were, or
could have been, elected by state legislatures. But the power or right of
instruction, it was sometimes argued, extended also to members of the
U.S. House of Representatives and to state officials. Given that the
original Constitution vests the state legislatures with the plenary power
to direct the “manner” in which the states’ presidential electors are
appointed, there is surely a possible analogy between those electors and
federal senators: both types of official, it might be said, are, or
originally were, subject to receiving “instructions” from the body that
85 RICHARD P. MCCORMICK, THE PRESIDENTIAL GAME: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 70 (1982) (The 1800 Presidential election “was a contest between
recently organized political parties. Among the prominent indicators of the presence of parties
were the congressional nominating caucuses, the disciplined voting of the electors, the rapid
emergence of organizations in the states, and the rigidity of the positions taken during the
contingent election by the House. The invention of nation-wide political parties, so evident by
1800, affected in many ways the process of electing the President.”)
86 See id. at 11 (“the most important single factor responsible for the characteristic two-party
system in the United States is the constitutionally determined rule that the victor in the
presidential contest must obtain a majority of the electoral vote”).
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elected or appointed them. There is a certain intuitive plausibility to this
idea, because if a state legislature may appoint presidential electors
itself87—and some state legislatures did in fact do so, up to the outbreak
of the Civil War—then it might be deduced that the state legislatures
could also “instruct” their electors how to vote. Electors, on this view,
would be mere mouthpieces of their state legislators—as senators, at
least according to some early commentators, were or might be. Further,
if state legislatures can “instruct” their electors how to vote, then it does
not seem to take a large step to conclude that statutes binding electors to
vote as pledged must be constitutional, as such requirements can be
seen as merely standing “instructions.”
The question of “instructions” was a key element in a broader
eighteenth century Anglo-American debate over the nature of political
“representation,” and even more fundamentally over the proper
conception of the relationship between “sovereignty” and
“government.”88 Was a member of the House of Commons or of the
U.S. Congress a “delegate” from a state or district, or was he a “trustee”
in whose judgment and discretion the voters confided? Eminent
protagonists were found on either side of that debate—Edmund Burke
on the side critical of any claim of power to instruct, Thomas Jefferson
on the other side. The First Congress considered and, after prolonged
debate, rejected, a proposal by Representative Thomas Tudor Tucker of
South Carolina to amend the Constitution to incorporate the power of
issuing binding instructions (to both senators and representatives).89 In
that debate, Congressman James Madison (who had himself once
violated his instructions as a Virginia delegate to the Continental
Congress) opposed Tucker’s proposed amendment, arguing that it was
“doubtful” whether Members of the federal Congress could be so
bound.90
The actual practice of “instruction” also showed marked
divergences. The “delegates” to the Constitutional Convention were
themselves under “instructions” from their states to vote in certain
ways. According to a delegate of Delaware, he and his colleagues were
“restrained by their commission from assenting to any change of the
rule of suffrage,” rather they were instructed to maintain the equal
87 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison) (The State legislatures “must in all cases
have a great share in [the President’s] appointment, and will, perhaps, in most cases, of
themselves determine it.”); see also William C. Kimberling, The Electoral College 5 (May 1992),
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/eleccoll.pdf.
88 That debate is admirably reviewed in RICHARD TUCK, THE SLEEPING SOVEREIGN: THE
INVENTION OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 121–248 (2015).
89 RALPH A. ROSSUM, FEDERALISM, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE SEVENTEENTH
AMENDMENT: THE IRONY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 98 (2001).
90 The entire debate in the House of Representatives in 1789, including Madison’s remarks
referred to in the text above, is available at, Debate in House of Representatives, THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION (1788), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch13s39.html.
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numerical representation of states.91 On the other hand, some delegates
at the convention “almost certainly went further than their instructions
allowed: [i]nstructed to amend the Articles [of Confederation], they
instead created a new system of government.”92
Let me give a—necessarily abbreviated—account of this great
Anglo-American debate. In England, the Common Law tradition
generally disfavored the practice of “instructions.” In his treatise
Institutes of the Lawes of England (1626–44), Lord Coke observed that
even though a member of Parliament was chosen from a particular
district, he nonetheless “serveth for the whole Realm, for the end of his
coming thither, as in the writ of his election appeareth, is general.” 93
John Hatswell, a leading eighteenth century expert on parliamentary
procedure, cited Coke, Algernon Sydney, Blackstone, and House of
Commons Speaker Arthur Onslow in support of the view that
instructions were non-binding.94 Nearer to the Founding, Anthony Ellys,
the Bishop of St. David’s, argued in Liberty Spiritual and Temporal of
the Subjects of England (1763–1765) that Members of Parliament,
“once chosen” were vested with “a discretionary power, to act as they
sought fit, within the established bounds of the constitution.”95
The question was debated in the House of Commons in March
1769, and although there were members who spoke in favor of
“instructions,” Jeremiah Dyson, a member who was regarded as an
expert on Parliamentary procedure, opined that attempts to bind
representatives by instructions had no authority under the
Constitution.96 In that debate, Edmund Burke unequivocally declared
that “the doctrine of instruction to representatives” was “unfounded in
reason; if not put down, it will destroy the constitution.” 97 Burke later
delivered his sentiments at great length in a celebrated 1774 address to
his Bristol constituents.98 In these speeches, Burke advanced a
“trusteeship” conception of the duties of a member of Parliament, under
which “the wishes of [a member’s] constituents ‘ought to have great
weight with him; their opinions high respect; their business unremitted
attention,’ but he should not sacrifice to them ‘his unbiased opinion, his
mature judgment, his enlightened conscience.’ In the last analysis, these
91 See Christopher Terranova, The Constitutional Life of Legislative Instructions in America,
84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1331, 1340 n.61 (2009).
92 Id. at 1341.
93 RICHARD BOURKE, EMPIRE & REVOLUTION: THE POLITICAL LIFE OF EDMUND BURKE 379
(2015).
94 See Terranova, supra note 91, at 1335 n.25.
95 Quoted in BOURKE, supra note 93, at 380.
96 See id. at 380–81.
97 Quoted in id. at 381.
98 See Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION
(1774), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch13s7.html.
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faculties should be exercised at the discretion of the member.”99 Burke’s
arguments did much to discredit the doctrine of binding instructions in
England.
This is not to say that the doctrine was without its supporters in
England.100 Early in the eighteenth century, a group of British radicals
“emphasized the tradition in England of mandates for Members of
Parliament from their constituents, and sought to refashion the [House
of] Commons as a house of mandated delegates.”101 James Burgh’s
Political Disquisitions (1775) articulated and defended their program.102
An edition of Burgh’s treatise was issued in Philadelphia in the same
year, with an endorsement from (General) George Washington.103
There were American supporters of mandatory instructions as well.
In Part VI of his 1814 treatise, Inquiry into the Principles of Policy of
the Government of the United States, John Taylor of Caroline argued
that the “right of instruction” was “appurtenant” to the power of
election.104 Thomas Jefferson approved of Taylor’s reasoning, writing to
him that his argument “settles unanswerably the right of instructing
representatives, and their duty to obey.” 105
Nonetheless, in America as well as in England, the doctrine of
instruction was widely criticized, and instructions were, in practice,
often disobeyed or disregarded—even by those, like Benjamin Watkins
Leigh, a senator from Virginia in the Jacksonian era, who in 1812 had
defended the doctrine.106 We have already seen that the “instructions”
conveyed to the delegates of the Philadelphia Convention were
disregarded, and that the First Congress rejected a proposed
constitutional amendment to authorize instructions to senators and
representatives.107 In some instances, senators, such as John Quincy
Adams of Massachusetts in 1808, resigned their seats rather than

99 FRANK O’GORMAN, EDMUND BURKE: HIS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 55 (1973).
100 For a sample of constituent “instructions” and “representations” sent to members of
Parliament in the 1740s, see 12 COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND: FROM THE
NORMAN CONQUEST, IN 1066, TO THE YEAR 1803, 1741–1743, 416–27 (1812), https://
babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015087740265;view=1up;seq=238;size=75.
101 TUCK, supra note 88, at 199.
102 See JAMES BURGH, 1 POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS; OR, AN ENQUIRY INTO PUBLIC ERRORS,
DEFECTS AND ABUSES (1775).
103 TUCK, supra note 88, at 200.
104 See JOHN TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES 370 (Dr. W. Stark ed., Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1950), http://lfoll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1308/0549_Bk.pdf.
105 Quoted in Clement Eaton, Southern Senators and the Right of Instruction, 1789-1860, 18 J.
Southern Hist. 303, 305 (1952).
106 See id. at 304–05, 311–15.
107 Note, however, that Tucker’s proposal to mandate instructions for Representatives as well
as for Senators may have contributed to its defeat. “[I]t is not clear that the First Congress ruled
out instructions to senators.” Terranova, supra note 91, at 1348.
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agreeing to follow instructions from their state legislatures.108 The
practice of instructing senators, though it persisted until the Civil War,
was also sectional, and was essentially confined to the South.
During the founding era, a “decisive” argument against instructions
was made by Roger Sherman:
I think, when the people have chosen a representative, it is his duty
to meet others from the different parts of the Union, and consult, and
agree with them on such acts as are for the general benefit of the
whole community. If they were to be guided by instructions, there
would be no use in deliberation.109

James Madison masterfully summed up the long debate in a letter
from March 1836:
The precise obligation imposed on a representative by the
instructions of his constituents still divides the opinions of
distinguished statesmen. This is the case in Great Britain, where such
topics have most been discussed. It is also now the case, more or
less, here, and was so at the first Congress under the present
Constitution. It being agreed by all, that whether an instruction be
obeyed or disobeyed, the act of the representative is equally valid
and operative, the question is a moral one between the representative
and his constituents. If satisfied that the instruction expresses the will
of his constituents, it must be with the representative to decide
whether he will conform to an instruction opposed to his judgment,
or will incur their displeasure by disobeying it. In a case necessarily
appealing to the conscience of the representative, its paramount
dictates must, of course, be his guide.110

There would be a number of problems with any attempt to extend
the purported right of instructions to presidential electors.
First, it is doubtful whether any such right or power ever existed.
Certainly many leading figures in the late eighteenth century, both in
England and America, questioned the truth of the doctrine or actively
resisted its application, including Edmund Burke, James Madison and
John Adams.
108 Adams’ letter of resignation can be found in DAVID KEMPER WATSON, 1 THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION 235
n.39 (1910). In the same year, former President John Adams, in a letter to Joseph Bradley
Varnum, wrote that “[u]pon principle, I see no right in our Senate and House to dictate, nor to
advise, nor to request our representatives in Congress.” 9 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 604, 605 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1854), http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/2107/
Adams_1431-09_Bk.pdf. John Adams did concede that “the people” had a right to instruct their
representatives, so long as they did not interfere with the State legislature. Id.
109 Quoted in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 51
(2006).
110 Quoted in WATSON, supra note 108, at 236.
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Second, it was both uncertain who wielded the asserted power
(State legislators? The voters?), and against whom the power could be
exercised (Senators? Representatives as well?).
Third, as James Madison noted, it was unclear whether the
proponents of the power were contending that the legislatures (or the
voters) had the right to communicate their views to their elected
representatives—a right that Madison observed was already provided
for111—or rather they were claiming that “delegates are obliged to
conform to those instructions”112—a proposition Madison found to be
untrue.113
Fourth, it is also unclear what the remedy (or preventative
measure) for a breach of instructions would have been. The obligation
to obey, as Madison put it, was a “moral” one; and a vote cast in
defiance of an instruction remained “valid and operative.”114 State
legislatures could do little else than to threaten recrimination.
Legislatures had no power to recall the senators they had selected: the
Constitution fixed their terms at six years.115 A legislature might not reelect a disobedient senator, but such a remedy would have existed even
if “instructions” were merely precatory, not mandatory. Likewise, an
erring senator might resign, but the decision to do so would be left to his
conscience—and some, like Virginia Senator William Mangam,116 did
not resign.
And that is not all. If the Constitution had permitted state
legislatures to mandate whom their presidential electors were to vote
for, then the electoral procedure could easily have turned into a
confused medley of opposing choices, as each state would have been
likely to prefer its “favorite son.” Why should the Framers have created
the Electoral College at all, if legislative instructions were likely to have
tipped the election into the House of Representatives anyway? Still
more, why bother to have presidential electors at all? Rather than both
appointing and instructing electors, it would have been much simpler to
give each state a number of voting “units” equivalent to the combined
number of its senators and representatives, and then let each state
legislature cast or apportion those units as it chose. Injecting the factor
of human agency—in the form of the electors—seems in itself to
preclude mandatory instructions.
111 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 766 (statement of Rep. Madison) (1789).
112 Id.
113 Quoted in Terranova, supra note 91, at 1349 n.114; see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 766–67
(statement of Rep. Madison) (1789).
114 Letter from James Madison to H. Lee (Jan. 14, 1825), in SELECTIONS FROM THE PRIVATE
CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES MADISON: FROM 1813–1836, 55 (Washington, J.C. McGuire
1859), https://archive.org/details/selectionsfrompr00madi.
115 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
116 Eaton, supra note 105, at 30810.
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III. RAY V. BLAIR
The Supreme Court has rarely spoken to issues involving the
Electoral College. When it spoke in 2000, first in Bush v. Palm Cty.
Canvassing Board117 and then in Bush v. Gore,118 it did so with
momentous consequences. For our immediate purposes, however, the
most relevant Supreme Court precedent is its 1952 decision, Ray v.
Blair.119
Ray was a dispute over the Democratic Party’s primary process in
Alabama in the run-up to the 1952 presidential election.120 In the 1948
presidential election, Alabama had cast its eleven Electoral College
votes for the segregationist candidate Strom Thurmond, who received
about 80% of the State’s popular vote.121 Thurmond ran as the
Democratic nominee for president, although the candidate for the
national Democratic Party was incumbent President Harry Truman. The
presidential election had been preceded by a bitter struggle in the
Democratic Party’s national convention that year, in which more than a
dozen members of the Alabama delegation, enraged at their Party’s call
for the desegregation of the military, walked out.122
By the time of the 1952 presidential primaries, the State
Democratic Executive Committee, acting pursuant to authority
conferred by state law, “closed the official primary to any candidate for
elector unless he would pledge himself, under oath, to support any
[presidential] candidate named by the Democratic National
Convention.”123 Plaintiff Edmund Blair, hoping to be a Democratic
elector, and otherwise qualified as a candidate, refused to take the
pledge to “aid and support” whoever would eventually be the
presidential nominee of the national Democratic Party124—who that
year turned out to be the liberal Adlai Stevenson of Illinois. When the
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the State’s Democratic Party
refused to certify Blair as a candidate for presidential elector, Blair
sued. He prevailed in a decision before the Supreme Court of

117 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam).
118 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
119 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
120 Id.
121 Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, 1948 Presidential General Election
Results
Alabama,
http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/
state.php?year=1948&fips=1&f=0&off=0&elect=0.
122 Michael Levy, United States Presidential Election of 1948, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/event/United-States-presidential-election-of-1948 (last updated Jan.
31, 2016).
123 Ray, 343 U.S. at 215–216, 233 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
124 Id. at 215–216.
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Alabama,125 which ruled that the requirement of a pledge was invalid
under the Twelfth Amendment.126 The case was taken to the U.S.
Supreme Court, which promptly heard oral arguments and issued a
summary per curiam opinion in time for the Alabama primary, in which
the Court overturned the Alabama Court’s decision and issued a
mandate.127 Shortly afterwards, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a more
detailed opinion intended to “supplement” its per curiam decision.128
Only seven Justices took part in the decision for Ray.129 Justice
Hugo Black, an Alabama native and a former U.S. Senator from that
state, was recused. Justice Felix Frankfurter was absent from the oral
argument due to illness, and took no part in the decision.130 The
majority opinion of five Justices was written by Stanley Reed, whom
President Franklin Roosevelt had appointed to the Court in 1938. Two
exceptionally able Justices, both of them also Roosevelt appointees,
dissented: Robert Jackson joined by William Douglas.131
Reed’s opinion is workmanlike but undistinguished—perhaps a
reflection of the haste with which the Court was forced to reach a
decision. Effectively, the Court addressed two questions: 1) Whether the
Alabama Democratic Party, acting under a state law delegation, could
prescribe the pledge132; and 2) if so, whether the pledge requirement
was consistent with the Twelfth Amendment.133
The first question caused the Court little difficulty—“[a] state’s or
a political party’s exclusion of candidates from a party primary because
they will not pledge to support the party’s nominees . . . in the general
election . . . . is an exercise of the state’s right to appoint electors in
such manner” as its legislature may direct.134 In other words, the Court
affirmed the breadth of the state legislature’s constitutional power to
“direct” the “[m]anner” in which the state appoints its presidential
electors.135 A state legislature can structure that appointment process by
delegating substantial powers to political parties. Pursuant to that
delegation, the parties may select their candidates for electorships
through an optional primary process, and can require prospective
candidates to pledge their support for the national party’s presidential
and vice-presidential nominees as a condition of their candidacy for
electorships.
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

Ray v. Blair, 57 So.2d 395 (Ala. 1952).
Id. at 397–98.
Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 154 (1952).
Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
Id. at 231.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 227.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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However, the Court recognized, the legislature’s exercise of its
Article II power, though broad, must accord with the other provisions of
the Constitution.136 As previously mentioned, one question raised in this
case was whether the pledge requirement was consistent with the
Twelfth Amendment. The parties did not raise the question of whether
the pledge requirement was consistent with other constitutional
provisions, such as the First Amendment. As the Court framed this
question, it was whether “the Twelfth Amendment demands absolute
freedom for the elector to vote his own choice, uninhibited by
pledge.”137 The Court tendered two main reasons for answering this
question in the negative.
First, the Twelfth Amendment does not explicitly forbid pledges,
thus its silence on that subject must be construed in light of
longstanding electoral practices.138 Given that the Amendment’s text (as
the Court read it) left the question open, the “constitutional propriety”
of exacting pledges could be decided in terms of the country’s “longcontinued practical interpretation” of the matter. 139 And “[h]istory
teaches that the electors were expected to support the party
nominees.”140
The Court furnished little evidence to substantiate its historical
claim. Even if it is true that electors have generally been “expected to
support the party nominees,”141 that does not establish a long-continued
and uncontested practice of requiring pledges to vote for a party’s
nominees by state law. An “expectation” of party loyalty might have
arisen even in the absence of any state statutory requirement to pledge
such loyalty. Further, how long-standing, widespread and
uncontroversial was the asserted practice? In the presidential election
less than four years prior, electors sailing under the Democratic banner
had voted against the national party’s nominee in fairly large numbers.
Alabama’s own requirement of a pledge to support the national party’s
nominee had only been introduced in the interval since that last election.
Even if there was, country-wide, a long-standing tradition of “faithful”
electors, there was also an equally long-standing tradition of “faithless”
electors.142 Which tradition was the dispositive one?
More relevant to our purposes, however, is the second of the
Court’s two main Twelfth Amendment arguments. In a crucial sentence,
136 Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228–31 (1952).
137 Id. at 228.
138 Id. at 228–29. “It is true that the Amendment says the electors shall vote by ballot. But it is
also true that the Amendment does not prohibit an elector’s . . . pledging himself.” Id. at 228.
139 Id. at 229.
140 Id. at 228.
141 Id.
142 See, e.g., supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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the Court said: “even if such promises of candidates for the electoral
college are legally unenforceable because violative of an assumed
constitutional freedom of the elector under the Constitution . . . to vote
as he may choose in the electoral college, it would not follow that the
requirement of a pledge in the primary is unconstitutional.”143 The
Court here decouples two questions: 1) the constitutionality of imposing
a pledge, and 2) the constitutionality of enforcing a pledge, if one is
imposed. Requiring a prospective elector to take a pledge in a primary is
indeed constitutional. But enforcing such a pledge, if violated, may or
may not be constitutional—the question is deliberately left open.
It would not be true to say that a pledge would be meaningless if it
could not be legally enforced. If an elector has sworn a pledge under
oath, the source of its enforcement could be the elector’s conscience, or
sense of honor, or fear of God. Faithless electors could also face adverse
political—if not legal—consequences for dishonoring a sworn pledge.
And even if some legal remedies, such as injunctive relief, were
unavailable or untimely, there might be other, post hoc remedies, such
as fines, money damages or criminal prosecutions for perjury.
The point to seize on is that the Supreme Court has not held that an
elector’s pledge is legally enforceable. It has left open the possibility
that if some legal action were taken against an elector to enforce a
pledge that he had taken, that elector could defend his action by
asserting a “constitutional freedom . . . to vote as he may choose in the
electoral college.”144 The constitutionality of imposing a pledge no
doubt makes it harder to be a faithless elector, but it does not
necessarily make it unlawful.
The Supreme Court’s case law thus leaves it open as to whether a
presidential elector can be bound, under penalty of law, to vote for a
particular nominee. And our review of the original materials in Parts I
and II establishes, I hope, that the Constitution protects the elector’s
discretion against efforts at legal compulsion. With this backdrop in
mind, we may finally turn to the constitutionality of the UFPEA.
IV. THE UNIFORM FAITHFUL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS ACT
Minnesota, along with several other states, has codified the
UFPEA.145 The key provision of the statute reads as follows:
208.46 ELECTOR VOTING.
(a) At the time designated for elector voting in section 208.06, and

143 Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 230 (1952) (emphasis added).
144 Id.
145 See MINN. STAT. §§ 208.40–208.48 (2015).
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after all vacant positions have been filled under section 208.45, the
secretary of state shall provide each elector with a presidential and a
vice-presidential ballot. The elector shall mark the elector’s
presidential and vice-presidential ballots with the elector’s votes for
the offices of president and vice president, respectively, along with
the elector’s signature and the elector’s legibly printed name.
(b) Except as otherwise provided by law of this state other than this
chapter, each elector shall present both completed ballots to the
secretary of state, who shall examine the ballots and accept as cast all
ballots of electors whose votes are consistent with their pledges
executed under section 208.43 or 208.45, paragraph (c). Except as
otherwise provided by law of this state other than this chapter, the
secretary of state may not accept and may not count either an
elector’s presidential or vice-presidential ballot if the elector has not
marked both ballots or has marked a ballot in violation of the
elector’s pledge.
(c) An elector who refuses to present a ballot, presents an unmarked
ballot, or presents a ballot marked in violation of the elector’s pledge
executed under section 208.43 or 208.45, paragraph (c), vacates the
office of elector, creating a vacant position to be filled under section
208.45.146

A.

Is the UFPEA Constitutional?

Observe that the statute does not require an elector to be removed
for violating his or her pledge. That, I think, is quite deliberate.
It is true that under Article II, Section 1, Clause 2, the state has the
power to “appoint” its electors, and it is often contended that the power
to appoint, all else being equal, entails the power to remove.147 At first
blush, moreover, it seems arguable that the power to remove a faithless
elector might be a power reserved to the state under the Tenth
Amendment.148 But the statute is very careful not to speak of removal.
Why not?
Even if the state could remove a faithless elector, his or her
removal would probably come too late: the faithless ballot would
already have been cast. The state might perhaps thereafter cancel or
nullify that vote—but it could only do so at the unacceptable risk of
losing one of its electoral college votes. Moreover, the Tenth
Amendment does not apply here. In the Term Limits case, the Supreme
146 Id.
147 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175–76 (1926).
148 U.S. CONST. amend. X (The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people).
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Court explained that when the Constitution itself has created the state
right or power at issue (there the context was the election of
representatives to the federal Congress), that right or power necessarily
could not have been reserved.149
Instead, the statute deems a vote in violation of a pledge to be
tantamount to a letter of resignation.150 In other words, it deems an
attempted faithless vote to create a vacancy. And because a vacancy has
arisen, the legislature may prescribe how that vacancy is to be filled.
If this is a valid exercise of the state’s power, it would indeed be a
very neat solution to the problem of the faithless elector. First, the
power to specify when a vacancy arises seems to be a proper exercise of
the state’s power to appoint. So too does the statutory prescription of
how a vacancy is to be filled. Second, the statute also effectively voids
or cancels the faithless elector’s attempted vote—but it does so in a way
that does not deprive the state of its maximum number of electoral
votes. It merely designates another elector—hopefully, a faithful one—
to occupy the vacancy and cast the missing vote.
But does this solution work? Can the state constitutionally
condition one’s ability to cast an Elector College ballot hinge how one
casts (or seeks to cast) that ballot? To put it provocatively: Is “The
Evaporating Elector” the answer to the problem of “The Faithless
Elector”? It is not.
B.

The Original Constitution

Even without reaching any amendments to the Constitution
(including the Twelfth Amendment151), the UFPEA provision is not a
valid exercise of the legislature’s Article II power. Both in intent and in
effect, the provision suppresses an elector’s exercise, or attempt to
exercise, his or her discretion over how to cast a ballot. The provision
treats some such exercises, or attempted exercises, as depriving the
elector of his or her appointment—and so as annulling or cancelling the
ballot that that elector has cast or seeks to cast. That is sufficient to
invalidate the law.152
149 U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 806 (1995).
150 According to a summary prepared by the Uniform Law Commission, “any attempt by an
elector to submit a vote in violation of that pledge effectively constitut[es] resignation from the
office of elector.” Faithful Presidential Electors Act Summary, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION: THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, http://
www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Faithful%20Presidential%20Electors%20Act.
151 Although a State’s power under Article II to regulate elections is “extensive,” it is
nonetheless subject to other constitutional requirements, including those of the Twelfth and
Fourteenth Amendments. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968).
152 Consider an analogy: Can Congress prescribe that certain acts taken by Executive branch
appointees or federal judges be deemed to have the effect of resignations, thus “vacating” those
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Article II, Section 1 protects against such attempted suppression,
both textually (by its use of terms such an “elector” and “ballot”) and
structurally (because if the state could determine electors’ choices in
this way, the entire apparatus of the Electoral College system would be
pointless). Moreover, the provision would upset the considered
intentions of both the Framers and, more importantly, the Ratifiers,
reflected in the text and structure of Article II—that presidential electors
should be free to exercise their judgment in deciding how to vote. And
even as construed in Ray, the Twelfth Amendment does not override the
original meaning and intent of the relevant parts of the elector clauses of
Article II.
In any case, the UFPEA provision does not go to the state’s
“appointment” of an elector under Article II. A faithless elector must
already have been “appointed” in order for his action to create a
vacancy. Thus, no appointment, no vacancy. The UFPEA instead goes
to the disqualification of a duly appointed elector and the designation of
a replacement. The language of Article II does not authorize the state to
disqualify and replace an elector once appointed.
Perhaps the state might try to argue that the effect of treating the
faithless elector’s (attempted) ballot as creating a vacancy is a condition
precedent to the elector’s appointment. On that view, the elector’s
appointment is not perfected or completed until a ballot consistent with
the pledge is cast. But if so, then no presumptive elector casting a
purported ballot is legally an elector until after the balloting, which
means no votes were cast.
Alternatively, the state might try to argue that casting a ballot
consistent with the pledge is a condition subsequent to the appointment.
The faithless ballot thus rescinds or revokes the appointment. But the
revocation then comes too late—the vote has already been cast.
All of this analysis is, to say, internal to the elector clauses of
Article II. Simply put, the argument is that those clauses do not
empower the state, in appointing its electors, to deprive them of all
possibility of exercising their discretion in casting their votes, even if
the votes they cast are in violation of their pledges.

offices? Of course not. Once appointed, these officials hold the powers they have been granted.
The exercise of a lawful power in a lawful manner cannot be deemed to be a “forfeiture” of a
constitutional position, thus creating a vacancy. So too with electors: if it is within their
constitutional authority to exercise discretion, then such an exercise cannot be deemed to create a
vacancy, and so obliterate itself. Granted, an elector, unlike a federal judge or administrator, is
not a federal office-holder. See In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890). But that fact does not
destroy the analogy.
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The First Amendment

Can we go even further? Perhaps. It seems to me at least plausible
to argue that the UFPEA raises First Amendment issues as well.
At first, the likelihood of a successful First Amendment challenge
seems remote. In its 2011 decision in Nevada Comm’n on Ethics v.
Carrigan, the Supreme Court rejected a claim that a legislator’s vote
was constitutionally protected speech.153 The case involved a Nevada
legislator’s challenge to a requirement under the State’s Ethics in
Government Law that the legislator recuse himself from voting on a
matter in which he had a personal conflict of interest.154 The Supreme
Court upheld the mandated recusal.155 In interpreting the First
Amendment, the Court relied on the long tradition of recusal statutes
that apply to legislators, going back to the earliest Congresses. 156 A
legislator’s vote, the Court said, was reposed in him “as trustee for his
constituents, not as a prerogative of personal power.”157 Hence
restriction on it, unlike restrictions on an ordinary citizen’s vote, was
permissible. If a presidential elector could be likened to a state
legislator, it might seem, the elector could not claim that his or her vote
constituted protected speech; rather, it might be subject to state
regulation. Indeed, if one could regard a breach (or attempted breach) of
a pledge as an ethical violation of an elector’s part, it might seem to
follow that the state could justify a mandatory recusal of the elector.
By contrast, however, consider a lower court case that Carrigan
cited but deemed to be irrelevant: Clarke v. United States158 There the
court addressed the question whether Congress could constitutionally
compel members of the City Council of the District of Columbia to
enact a particular piece of legislation—the so-called “Armstrong
Amendment.”159 The City Council members objected, arguing that their
votes on legislation were protected “speech” under the First
Amendment, and that in seeking to compel them to vote for a particular
outcome, Congress was unconstitutionally abridging their free speech
rights.160 While recognizing the breadth of congressional power over the
District of Columbia, the court agreed with the council members.161
Following the First Circuit’s lead, the court concluded that legislators’

153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161

Nevada Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117, 119–21 (2011).
Id. at 125.
Id. at 120–21, 128–29.
Id. at 122–25.
Id. at 126 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997)).
886 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated as moot, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
Id. at 405.
Id. at 409.
Id. at 417.
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voting fell within the Free Speech Clause.162
Should we follow Carrigan and conclude that an elector’s vote,
like a legislator’s, is not protected speech? Should we even press on to
the further conclusion that an elector’s faithlessness to a pledge justifies
a compulsory recusal? Or should we follow Clarke in thinking that an
elector’s vote, like a legislator’s, is constitutionally protected—at least
to the extent that that the government may not compel or direct how it is
cast? Would that not be a case of “compelled speech”? And can
mandatory recusal really be justified when the state itself has created the
conflict by extracting the legislator’s pledge?
Actually, both Carrigan and Clarke were correctly decided, and
they can be satisfactorily harmonized. To recur the terms employed in
our discussion of “instructions,” both cases rest on the conception of a
legislator as a trustee, not a delegate. As a trustee, the legislator owes
his constituents his fair, disinterested judgment and vote. Carrigan
brings out one aspect of the trusteeship model, Clark brings out another,
complementary aspect. Because the legislator’s vote must be
disinterested, recusal can be mandated when a conflict arises between
that fiduciary duty and his personal interests. So Carrigan is right. But
equally, because a legislator, as trustee, has the responsibility to
exercise his own fair judgment, his vote cannot be compelled—he has a
right and a duty to vote as he judges best. Thus Clark is also right.
If the free speech/legislative vote cases are relevant, they seem to
reinforce the trusteeship model of the representative/elector, not the
delegate model. Accordingly, those cases would confirm that the elector
possesses constitutionally privileged discretion in casting his ballot,
which can indeed be limited in the case of a faithless (or any other)
elector, but only to avoid self-dealing, bias or some other corrupting
consideration.
CONCLUSION
The UFPEA is unconstitutional. Admittedly, that conclusion rests
on grounds that are severely originalist.163 And, need one say, the courts
do not always dispose of constitutional questions using originalist
methods.
There are unquestionably powerful non-originalist reasons not to
welcome the outcome at which I have arrived. For one thing, if political
parties cannot enforce electors’ pledges by legal means, then our two162 Id.
163 See Robert J. Delahunty and John Yoo, Saving Originalism, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 1081
(2015) (providing an analysis and defense of originalism).
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party system, already in bad repair, may be weakened even further. That
is not a result that would be appreciated in most circumstances,
including within the Supreme Court.164 Further, the authority and
legitimacy of the president—especially one elected as a result of the
faithlessness of one or more electors—could be badly compromised,
contributing further to the instability and bad repute of the federal
government. Finally, and most importantly, millions of American voters
would be shocked and appalled if the outcome of a presidential election
turned on the votes of faithless electors. Ordinary voters may not even
realize that in voting, say, for Hillary Clinton, they are in fact voting for
a slate of unnamed electors who may be pledged to vote for her but who
could well vote for someone else, including her opponent. The public’s
confidence in the fairness, coherence and transparency of our
presidential election system could easily be shattered. 165
It would not be difficult to find eminent legal scholars prepared to
argue that more than two centuries of constitutional practice have
overwhelmed the Framers’ short-lived expectations for the Electoral
College. In the view of some of these scholars, the Constitution can be
and has been informally, but definitively, amended by the inexorable,
long-term workings of American democracy. We are no longer bound to
follow the strict letter of the presidential election clauses of the
Constitution—even if we could all concur on how to interpret them.166
It would go beyond my brief here to attempt to answer these
objections. And I freely concede their pragmatic power. Still, let me
offer a few contrarian concluding observations.
There are traditions and then there are traditions. There is certainly
a well-established tradition of treating members of the Electoral College
as mere automata, whisked into existence for the sole purpose of
performing a single mechanical, unthinking function. But there have
also been repeated instances of faithless electors—although it might be
an exaggeration to say that the accumulation of those instances amounts
to a “tradition.”167 Even if presidential electors are merely one trick
ponies, at least some of the ponies have demanded to do the trick in
their own way.
More to the point, there have been unceasing efforts since the early
days of the American Republic to reform or eliminate the Electoral
College: in the past two centuries, over 700 proposed constitutional
164 See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 366–67 (1997).
165 But then, most voters will probably also be shocked to discover that “[t]he individual
citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States
unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its
power to appoint members of the Electoral College. U.S. Const., Art. II, §1.” Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98, 104 (2000).
166 See ACKERMAN, supra note 15, at 27, 266.
167 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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amendments to the Electoral College system have been introduced in
Congress.168 And yet, with the exception of some rather marginal
changes, the original Electoral College has remained essentially intact
since the Twelfth Amendment. Indeed, the relatively recent (1961)
Twenty-Third Amendment embeds the Electoral College even more
deeply in the Constitution, and so can be taken as a reaffirmation of the
continuing vitality and constitutional centrality of that institution.169 If
nothing else, the repeated failure of attempts to eliminate the Electoral
College by constitutional amendment seems to betray a gnawing
awareness on the part of the American people that for better or worse, it
is still with us.
The truth is that a solution to the problem that baffled the Framers
also eludes us: How is America to elect its presidents? Their answer, as
they came to realize themselves, was radically unsatisfactory. But over
the intervening centuries, alas, “We the People” have proven no wiser.
As John Quincy Adams said, in reflecting on the manner of choosing
the president, “[t]his election of a chief magistrate will never be settled
to the satisfaction of the people.”170

168 See Hans A. von Spakovsky, Destroying the Electoral College: The Anti-Federalist
National Popular Vote Scheme, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Oct. 27, 2011), http://
www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/10/destroying-the-electoral-college-the-anti-federalistnational-popular-vote-scheme. For a survey of the various kinds of proposed amendments, see
NEALE, supra note 7, at 13–15.
169 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1.
The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall appoint in
such manner as the Congress may direct: A number of electors of President and Vice
President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to
which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the
least populous State; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they
shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to
be electors appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such
duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment.
Id.
170 Quoted in MCCORMICK, supra note 85, at 3.

